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Can goveRnments ensuRe adheRenCe to the 
polluteR pays pRinCiple in the long-teRm  
CCs liability Context?
by Paul Bailey, Elizabeth McCullough, and Sonya Suter*
InTroducTIon
It is well-accepted within the scientific community that global climate change is a real and urgent challenge facing the planet.1 One technological method that has gained 
significant support from government and industry for reducing 
global emissions of carbon dioxide (“CO2”), the most prevalent 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas,2 is carbon capture and sequestration 
(“CCS”).3 CCS is a process by which CO2 is isolated from an 
emissions stream, compressed, and transported to a CO2 storage 
facility deep underground where it is stored permanently.4 How-
ever, two regulatory barriers to widespread CCS deployment 
include (1) the lack of comprehensive climate change legisla-
tion including a price on carbon and (2) the lack of regulatory 
certainty surrounding long-term CCS liabilities.5 This article 
focuses on the second of these two barriers.
This article analyzes possible regulatory frameworks to 
address long-term CCS liabilities from the perspective of the 
Polluter Pays Principle (“PPP”). The analysis begins with a brief 
description of CCS’s role in reducing global CO2 emissions 
and the regulatory barriers to CCS implementation. Next, the 
article introduces the PPP, explaining its origins and influence 
on environmental policy. The article then presents four possible 
regulatory frameworks for long-term CCS liabilities within the 
PPP context, providing examples of countries and programs 
where these frameworks are either in place or proposed. The 
frameworks analyzed are: (1) transfer of liability, (2) govern-
ment indemnification, (3) owner/operator retention of long-term 
liabilities without financial responsibility requirements, and (4) 
an industry-funded pooled trust fund. Finally, this article con-
cludes that an industry-funded pooled trust fund is the frame-
work most in line with the PPP in the CCS context because it is 
the scenario in which the polluter is most likely to pay for, and 
the public is most likely to avoid, the greatest portion of long-
term CCS liability costs.
background
Climate Change and CaRbon CaptuRe and 
sequestRation
Climate change is a term that refers to major alterations in 
the climate (i.e. temperature, extreme weather events, droughts, 
and higher sea levels) that is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmo-
sphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability 
observed over comparable periods of time.6 Although the Earth’s 
climate has changed many times throughout its history, the rapid 
warming seen today exceeds any changes over the past 650,000 
years and cannot rationally be explained by natural processes.7 
Many greenhouse gases, like water vapor and CO2, which trap heat 
in the atmosphere, occur naturally.8 However, human activities, 
including fuel burning, are adding large amounts of CO2 to the 
natural mix of atmospheric gases at a rapid rate that is projected 
to increase in the coming years.9 The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report 
determined that “most of the observed increase in global aver-
age temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely 
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations,” with the term “very likely” corresponding to at 
least ninety percent certainty.10 According to the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”):
Climate change is a real and urgent challenge that is 
already affecting people and the environment world-
wide. Significant changes are occurring on the Earth, 
including increasing air and ocean temperatures, wide-
spread melting of snow and ice, and rising sea levels. 
. . . For this reason, human-caused climate change 
represents a serious challenge – one that could require 
new approaches and ways of thinking to ensure the  
continued health, welfare, and productivity of society 
and the natural environment.11
CCS has emerged as viable a method to reduce these 
detrimental GHG emissions.12 During the CCS process, CO2 
is isolated from an emissions stream, compressed, transported, 
and permanently stored underground in a CO2 storage facility.
13 
While reducing emissions will require multiple strategies, 
according to the International Energy Agency’s (“IEA”) World 
Energy Outlook for 2011, “[i]f CCS is not widely deployed in the 
2020s, an extraordinary burden would rest on other low-carbon 
technologies to deliver lower emissions in line with global 
climate objectives.”14 The IEA estimates that CCS could account 
for approximately ten percent of needed reductions in emissions 
by 2050.15
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Currently, there are fifteen CCS projects around the world 
that are under construction or in operation, with an additional 
fifty-nine in the planning phases.16 These fifteen projects 
have the capacity to sequester 35.4 million tons per year of 
CO2—approximately the equivalent of Norway’s annual 
emissions.17 There is, however, public concern about the safety 
and viability of CCS projects. For example, the proposed 
Vattenfall Jänschwalde plant in the Brandenburg region of 
Germany was recently canceled due, in part, to opposition from 
nearby residents, and, in part, to a lack of a legal framework for 
CCS.18 Though the European Commission required countries 
to establish national CCS legal frameworks, Germany’s 2011 
parliament repeatedly failed to pass such a law despite a proposal.19
maJoR baRRieRs to widespRead deployment  
of industRial-sCale CCs
In August 2010, the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Carbon 
Capture and Storage (“Task Force”) identified several barriers to 
the widespread deployment of CCS.20 Two regulatory barriers 
that the Task Force identified include: (1) the lack of comprehen-
sive climate change legislation that establishes a price on carbon 
and (2) the lack of regulatory certainty surrounding long-term 
CCS liabilities.21 With respect to the first, the Task Force stated:
Establishing a clear price signal on GHG emissions . . .  
will also put established low-carbon technologies on a 
level playing field with conventional carbon-emitting 
technologies, yield near-term opportunities for emerg-
ing technologies, and create greater market certainty for 
long-term investments in new or improved low-carbon 
energy technology development.22
Although the Task Force identified a price on carbon as 
a “threshold barrier for further CCS technological develop-
ment,”23 this article focuses on the second barrier and assumes 
that comprehensive climate change legislation will be developed 
in those jurisdictions where it is currently absent.
The second barrier, the lack of regulatory certainty surround-
ing long-term CCS liabilities, is of particular concern because 
financial resources sufficient to cover long-term liabilities 
must be available over an indefinite time-frame in order to (1) 
fulfill CCS’s purpose—permanent storage of CO2—which may 
require indefinite stewardship of CCS sites and (2) ensure that 
human health and the environment are not negatively impacted. 
Following from these two long-term needs, relevant long-term 
liabilities can be divided into two major categories: long-term 
stewardship and long-term compensatory liability. Long-term 
stewardship includes obligations to perform maintenance respon-
sibilities (e.g., long-term water quality monitoring or land use 
controls). Long-term compensatory liability includes obligations 
to reimburse parties for various types and forms of legally-
compensable losses or damage due to CO2 storage.
the polluteR pays pRinCipal
The Polluter Pays Principle (“PPP”) is an environmental 
policy principle reflecting the idea that the costs of pollution 
should be borne by those who cause it.24 The PPP has been said 
to provide several benefits including promotion of economic 
efficiency, legal justice, harmonization of international policies, 
and definition of cost allocation within an economy.25
The first mention of the PPP at the international level 
occurred in the 1972 Recommendation by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Council on 
Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects 
of Environmental Policies.26 There the OECD announced: “The 
principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution preven-
tion and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce 
environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international 
trade and investment is the so-called Polluter-Pays Principle.”27 
The 1972 Recommendation continued, stating that the polluter 
should be responsible for costs associated with pollution preven-
tion and control.28 It also emphasized “the necessity for removal 
of subsidies that would prevent polluters from bearing the full 
cost of pollution which they caused.” 29
Since the 1972 Recommendation, the PPP has been reaf-
firmed by other international declarations. Its adoption by the 
1992 Rio Declaration is one such example. Principle 16 of the 
Declaration states: “National authorities should endeavor to 
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use 
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach 
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, 
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment.”30 As another example, the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community provides that “[c]
ommunity policy on the environment [ . . . ] shall be based on 
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”31 
The incorporation of the PPP in multiple international declara-
tions and treaties demonstrates its widespread acceptance as a 
legitimate legal principle.
appLyIng ppp To The ccs conTexT
In the CCS context, CO2 is the pollution that the polluter 
ought to pay for under PPP. The polluter in the CCS context 
would likely, but not exclusively, be the owner/operator of a coal 
or natural gas-fired power plant, which emits CO2 as a byproduct 
of producing electricity.32 The operation and maintenance of the 
CO2 storage facility, including the cost of all liabilities associ-
ated with the capture, transport, and sequestration of CO2, is the 
pollution prevention and control method.33 Despite international 
acceptance of the PPP, many governments across the globe have 
adopted regulatory frameworks that subsidize the long-term lia-
bility costs associated with CCS.34 Government subsidization of 
long-term CCS liabilities transfers a portion of the responsibility 
to pay for CO2 pollution away from the CO2 storage facility 
owner/operator and onto the public.35
Internationally, regulatory frameworks to deal with long-
term CCS liabilities or long-term liabilities for industries 
analogous to CCS come in many different forms, including: 
(1) transfer of liability, (2) government indemnification, (3) 
owner/operator retention of long-term liability, without financial 
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responsibility requirements, and (4) industry funded pooled trust 
funds.
liability tRansfeR
One option for handling long-term CCS liability is to 
transfer long-term CCS liabilities from the CO2 storage facility 
owner/operator to the government. Under this arrangement, 
the government agrees to accept liability after the CO2 storage 
facility stops injecting CO2.36 Although the scope of transferred 
liabilities varies, a transfer of liability in the CCS context would 
typically include stewardship obligations, requiring indefinite care 
of the CO2 storage facility.37 Under these frameworks, certain 
liabilities typically remain with the site owner/operator such as 
tort liability for releases caused by gross negligence.38
In practice, liability transfer has been enacted by the CCS 
regulatory frameworks in the United Kingdom (“UK”), Spain, 
and France.39 The United States also takes a similar approach to 
regulating long-term liabilities for radioactive waste.40
UK regulations enacted in 2011 allow a CO2 storage facility 
operator to transfer responsibility for long-term compensatory 
liability and stewardship of its CCS site to the government after 
a twenty-year period of monitoring and performing corrective 
action as necessary.41 Under this framework, long-term compen-
satory liability includes “any liabilities, whether future or present, 
actual or contingent, arising from leakage from the storage com-
plex . . . and includes liabilities for personal injury, damage to 
property and economic loss.”42 The operator retains liability for 
leakages that occur prior to the transfer and leakages that occur 
after the transfer but are due to negligence, deceit, or a failure to 
exercise due diligence;43 in the case of a leak where the operator 
is at fault, the government may recover its costs.44 The UK 
requires operators to pay a financial contribution prior to the site 
transfer in order to cover the government’s expected post-transfer 
costs.45 However, the European Commission guidance on post-
transfer cost estimates, referenced in the UK regulations, seems 
to account for monitoring costs only, and not compensatory 
liability costs.46 While the guidance explicitly requires that costs 
of monitoring be covered for a thirty-year period, it does not 
mention any costs related to potential compensatory liability.47
Spain and France employ similar liability transfer 
approaches in order to comply with the European Commission’s 
2009 Directive on the Geological Storage of CO2.48 Both coun-
tries require a minimum period of thirty years of post-closure 
site care and require that an owner or operator meet certain 
criteria prior to site liability transfer.49 Spain’s framework also 
explicitly includes monitoring, maintenance, corrective action, 
storage sealing, removal of the CO2 storage facilities, and com-
pliance with preventative measures and repairs.50 However, the 
Spanish government does not assume liability for monitoring 
and maintenance costs in cases of operator misconduct. 51
France transfers similar liabilities, including long-term 
compensatory liability (for surrendering allowances to offset 
leaks), monitoring and verification of the safety of the CO2 
storage facility, response costs of a post-closure accident, and 
clean up after injections cease.52 France also requires the owner/
operator to pay a stewardship contribution to cover a minimum 
of thirty years of monitoring.53
These CCS requirements mirror the U.S. approach to 
handling long-term liability in its regulation of the disposal of 
uranium or thorium byproduct materials, which also requires 
indefinite stewardship.54 Disposal sites for these radioactive 
materials are covered by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation 
Control Act of 1978 (“UMTRCA”),55 which allows Department 
of Energy (“DOE”), another agency, or a state to manage custody 
and long-term care of the sites.56 In order for site liability to be 
transferred, the operator must have closed the disposal facility 
to reduce radioactivity at the site, and prepared a Long-Term 
Surveillance Plan.57 Additionally, uranium mill operators must 
pay “a minimum of $250,000 (1978 dollars) to cover the costs 
of long-term surveillance,” although the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”) may adjust this amount.58 Titles to both 
the sites and the uranium byproduct material are transferred to 
the government permanently59—six sites are currently managed 
by DOE, which expects to manage up to twenty-seven60—but 
site transfer does not relieve the prior license holder from liability 
for fraud or negligence prior to transfer.61 Specifically, the 
requirements for transfer hold that sites transferred to the gov-
ernment should “be such that ongoing active maintenance is not 
necessary to preserve isolation.”62
All of these programs in some way incorporate the PPP by 
requiring the owner/operator to cover the government’s stewardship 
responsibilities and leaving some liability with the owner/opera-
tor in the event of misconduct. However, the degree to which 
the cost of pollution will be borne by the owner/operator relies 
heavily on both the government’s assessments of future costs 
prior to transfer and on the government’s willingness to require 
payment of the assessed amount. Additionally, in the event of 
owner/operator misconduct, the framework relies on the courts 
to enforce payment. Given that CCS is a novel technology with 
uncertain costs, assessments of future costs are unlikely to be 
consistently accurate and proving misconduct or negligence will 
be far from straightforward in the courts. This leaves the strong 
possibility that the government and taxpayers would support the 
long-term liability of the CCS industry.
indemnifiCation
The second option is government indemnification of the 
owner/operator’s long-term CCS liabilities. Under this arrange-
ment, the government agrees to reimburse the owner/operator 
for actual liabilities sustained.63 Here, the indemnifying govern-
ment could limit an indemnity in cases of gross negligence or 
misconduct.64 Governmental indemnification could be provided 
for a pre-determined number of demonstration projects, which 
would be phased out as CCS commercializes, the cost of CCS 
lowers, and liabilities become more predictable.65
Government indemnification is currently used to regulate 
long-term CCS liabilities in Australia.66 Additionally, federal 
indemnification of long-term CCS liabilities was proposed by 
U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) in the 112th Congress 
on March 31, 2011, which, after having been approved by the 
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Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, is awaiting 
full Senate consideration.67
The Australian Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2006 (“OPGGS Act”) provides mandatory indemnifi-
cation by the Australian Government for specified long-term CCS 
liabilities.68 Liability under this law rests with the holder of the 
CO2 injection license during the course of the licensed injection 
and storage activities.69 Following the cessation of injection 
and storage activities, the licensee must apply for a site closure 
certificate.70
Assuming the Australian Government is prepared to issue a 
site closure certificate, the licensee will receive a pre-certificate 
notice.71 This notice sets out the financial contribution that 
must be paid by the owner/operator, which is equivalent to the 
estimated costs to be incurred by the Australian Government in 
carrying out long-term stewardship of the storage formation.72
Following a site closure, the licensee will continue to 
remain at risk for liabilities arising from its operations.73 At least 
fifteen years after issuing a site closure certificate, the Australian 
government may declare that the closure assurance period has 
been reached.74 Based on the fifteen year period of monitoring, 
the Australian government must be satisfied that:
1 The injected CO2 is behaving as predicted in the approved 
site plan;
2 there is “no significant risk” that the substance will have a 
“significant adverse impact” (SRSAI) on the geotechnical 
integrity of whole or part of the storage formation, the envi-
ronment, or on human health and safety; and
3 no injection operations have taken place since the recorded 
cessation date.75
Once there is a valid site closure certificate and a declared 
closure assurance period, the Australian government then indem-
nifies the injection licensee against specified liabilities.76 The 
scope of the Australian government’s indemnification is limited 
by the following four conditions:
1 the liability is a liability for damages;
2 the liability is attributable to an act done or omitted to be 
done in the carrying out of operations authorized by the 
license;
3 the liability is incurred or accrued after the end of the 
closure assurance period; and
4 such other conditions (if any) as are specified in the 
regulations.77
The licensee will continue to be at risk of incurring the full 
costs of liabilities that fall outside of the scope of these indemnifi-
cation conditions.78 For example, the licensee will continue to be 
fully responsible for acts or omissions in carrying out activities 
that were not authorized under the OPGGS Act.79
In the U.S., the Anti-Deficiency Act prevents the U.S. 
government from agreeing to open-ended indemnification 
arrangements absent specific Congressional authorization, which 
has rarely been granted.80 However, The Department of Energy 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration Program Amendments Act 
of 2011 (S. 699) provides an opportunity for indemnification 
in the domestic CCS regime.81 This bill directed the Secretary 
of Energy (DOE) to conduct a program to demonstrate the 
commercial application of CCS and authorized the Secretary 
of Energy to enter into cooperative agreements with up to ten 
demonstration projects for indemnification of liabilities up to 
$10 billion collectively.82 Essentially, the bill proposes a waiver 
of the Anti-Deficiency Act that would allow the DOE to sign 
indemnification agreements and would provide a permanent, 
indefinite appropriation for any costs incurred by DOE to 
indemnify sponsors of demonstration projects and remediate 
sites.83 Exceptions to federal indemnities include any liabilities 
that result from gross negligence or intentional misconduct by 
the site operator.84 To be eligible, each large-scale demonstration 
project must inject over one million tons of carbon dioxide each 
year from “industrial sources” (not naturally occurring CO2) for 
a period of ten years.
The bill also authorizes the collection of indemnification 
fees.85 With this authority the DOE will be able to collect fees 
in amounts to be determined by the Secretary of Energy from 
operators receiving indemnification based on the likelihood of 
incidents resulting from specific risk-based hazards during post-
closure stewardship.86 The fees will be collected in an amount 
equal to the estimated amount of payments expected to be made 
by the United States to cover liability under the indemnification 
agreements.87 This bill was introduced on March 31, 2011 and 
received approval from the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources on May 26, 2011.88 However, as of March 
26, 2012, the Senate has not considered or voted on the bill and 
immediate consideration is unlikely given an upcoming election 
and the current congressional climate.89
Similar to the transfer of liability framework, both of 
these indemnification frameworks serve as a subsidy that could 
prevent polluters from bearing the full costs of the pollution they 
have caused.90 When compared to transfer of liability, indem-
nification provides a lower level of subsidy because the owner/
operator is responsible to initially bear the cost of liability and 
then seek reimbursement.91 However, indemnification, as seen 
in Senator Bingaman’s bill, could provide an appropriate legal 
framework if CCS can garner sufficient governmental support.
owneR/opeRatoR Retention of long-teRm 
liabilities without finanCial Responsibility 
RequiRement
Another option for handling long-term CCS liability is 
for the owner/operator to retain liability indefinitely without 
requiring a demonstration of financial responsibility. Under this 
arrangement, the owner/operator is responsible for long-term 
compensatory liability for the CO2 storage facility, but does 
not have explicit long-term stewardship obligations and is not 
required to act until damages occur.92
The United States currently employs a CCS regulatory 
framework that requires owner/operator retention of long-term 
CCS liabilities without a financial responsibility requirement.93 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), the U.S. federal law 
regulating CCS, does not provide authority to any government 
agency to transfer liability for a CO2 storage facility from 
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one entity (i.e., owner/operator) to another (i.e., a government 
agency).94 Under the SDWA, owners/operators of CO2 storage 
facilities must ensure protection of underground sources of 
drinking water from endangerment and are subject to liability 
for enforcement under the Act.95 Once an owner or operator has 
met all regulatory requirements and received approval for site 
closure, the owner/operator will generally be free from liability 
under the SDWA.96 However, even after site closure, the owner/
operator will always be required to comply with governmental 
orders to protect human health if, for example, there is fluid 
migration at a CO2 storage facility that causes or threatens 
imminent and substantial endangerment to an underground 
source of drinking water.97 Furthermore, after site closure, an 
owner/operator remains liable under tort and other remedies, or 
under other statutes such as the Clean Air Act.98
Owner/operator retention of long-term CCS liability is 
a regulatory framework closely in-line with the PPP because 
each owner/operator, theoretically, is independently responsible 
for the total costs of long-term CCS stewardship and liability. 
However, in the CCS context, which occurs over an indefinite 
timeframe, it is likely that the CO2 storage facility owner/operator 
will go out of business, experience severe financial problems, 
or otherwise desert their responsibilities prior to the end of the 
relevant long-term liability period.99 For example, gas compa-
nies could declare bankruptcy without leaving sufficient funds to 
cover the long term cost of their actions.100 Under scenarios such 
as this, long-term liabilities which arise when the owner/operator 
is no longer a viable entity become the responsibility of the 
public. Therefore, over the indefinite time-frame associated with 
CCS activities, owner/operator retention of long-term liabilities 
without financial responsibility requirements, in practice, is not 
as closely in-line with the PPP as one may initially believe.
industRy-funded pooled tRust fund
A final option for addressing long-term CCS liability is to 
use an industry-pooled trust fund to generate resources to cover 
long-term liabilities associated with a group of CCS facilities. 
Under this approach, CCS storage facility owner/operators 
would be required to pay into a fund that the government would 
hold in trust for use in paying for long-term CCS liabilities.
The Carbon Capture and Sequestration Deployment Act of 
2010 (S.3589) 101 was introduced by Senator John Rockefeller 
(D-WV) and proposed a pooled trust fund for post-closure 
stewardship funded by per-ton fees on injected CO2.
102 Although 
not reintroduced in the 112th U.S. Congress, an examination 
of the bill provides one possible direction for a U.S. approach 
to long-term CCS liability.103 As proposed, the fee would be 
based on a risk assessment of the type of CO2 injection site 
(e.g., type of rock where the CO2 is being injected).
104 As with 
other approaches described here, the Rockefeller proposal would 
have allowed for a transfer of site stewardship and liability to 
the government, with exceptions for breach of contract, willful 
violations of rules, and reckless or intentional misconduct on the 
part of the operator.105 Currently, under federal regulations, a 
certificate of closure is issued at a minimum of fifty years after 
operations cease, during which the operator is responsible for 
monitoring the site.106
Under the Rockefeller proposal, damages arising from the 
site could be paid for from three sources: (1) the Stewardship 
Trust Fund; (2) the stewardship agency itself; or (3) the site 
operator.107 Money in the stewardship fund would be used to pay 
for administrative, monitoring, and remediation costs that arise 
after the site was transferred to the government.108 The steward-
ship agency (a state government or the DOE) would be liable for 
performance of its stewardship duties.109 The operator would be 
liable only for claims, compensation, or reimbursement due to 
gross negligence, intentional misconduct, and if the Stewardship 
Trust Fund did not have sufficient funds to pay for damages.110 
Decisions on who would be liable in a particular circumstance 
would be made by a public claims office within the DOE.111
As with the liability transfer frameworks discussed above, 
this approach has the potential to require the polluter to pay for 
all damages or site care because the owner/operator would pay 
for all government responsibilities upfront. The requirement that 
the owner/operators pay for damages in the event that the fund 
did not have enough money further aligns with the polluter pays 
principle.112 A fifty year post-closure period increases the likeli-
hood of the owner/operator paying for problems associated with 
its CO2 storage facility prior to transfer, assuming that problems 
would emerge in the years immediately after injection operations 
cease. However, a pooled trust fund is effective only if the risk-
based fees collected from the owner/operators fully account for 
the cost of CCS facilities’ long-term liabilities. Similarly, the 
requirement that the owner/operators pay in the event of fund 
insolvency is effective only where owner/operators still exist and 
are solvent when the funds are required.113
The idea of an industry-funded pooled trust fund is not new, 
with several used currently by the U.S. government to deal with 
such issues as abandoned coal mines and nuclear waste.114 One 
such existing fund is the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is 
financed by an eight cents per barrel tax on petroleum.115 The 
fund, created in 1990, has increased the tax once, from five to 
eight cents, with an additional increase planned for 2017.116 The 
trust fund is used to pay for oil spill cleanup costs and related 
purposes.117 While this fund is currently solvent, recent events 
such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 illustrate that the 
fund alone is insufficient to finance all oil spill liability; the Oil 
Spill fund may not spend more than one billion dollars per inci-
dent, and the fund set up to handle Deepwater Horizon claims is 
due to be funded to $20 billion by 2014.118
Given the indefinite nature of long-term CCS liabilities, a 
trust fund provides a way to ensure that the polluter pays for 
at least a portion of the costs of future care of the CO2 storage 
facility and any associated liabilities, even if the polluter 
becomes insolvent or is no longer in business. Although there is 
no guarantee that the trust fund will be viable for an indefinite 
amount of time, it is more likely that a portion of long-term CCS 
liabilities will be borne by the polluters than under the other three 
frameworks discussed. Therefore, in the long-term CCS con-
text, an industry-funded trust fund is the regulatory framework 
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most in-line with the PPP; it establishes a scenario in which the 
polluter is most likely to take responsibility for long-term liabilities 
and the public is the least likely to be stuck with the cost.
concLusIon
In its simplest terms, the PPP reflects the idea that the costs 
of pollution should be borne by those who cause it. Of the four 
frameworks discussed, an industry-funded pooled trust fund is 
the framework most in-line with the PPP in the CCS context 
because it is the scenario in which the polluter is most likely 
to pay for and the public is most likely to avoid the costs of the 
greatest portion of long-term CCS liabilities. However, currently, 
the majority of governments who have chosen to establish a legal 
framework regulating CCS have chosen to subsidize long-term 
CCS liabilities, to some degree, through a regulatory framework 
that includes transfer of long-term liabilities, while still requiring 
some industry contribution or maintaining some industry liability.119 
This partial acceptance of the PPP can be justified in two ways: 
(1) the indefinite timeframe associated with CCS liabilities, 
which may not practically be paid for by an owner/operator with 
a limited life-cycle, presents an unusual regulatory scenario that 
many governments have limited experience addressing, and (2) 
the national and global interest many governments recognize in 
combating global climate change presents an immediate concern 
that may outweigh the benefits associated with strict adher-
ence to the PPP. However, as governments begin to gain more 
information about the long-term liabilities associated with CCS, 
the severity of potential impacts of global climate change, and 
other technological options for mitigation, a regulatory system 
that accounts for the PPP will perhaps be adopted in a greater 
number of jurisdictions.
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